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INTRODUCTION
During the past two years, right-to-die law has apparently under-
gone a dramatic shift. Until recently, the law drew a clear distinction
between the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment' and physician as-
sisted suicide. 2
 Treatment withdrawal was permitted, indeed required,
upon the patient's request, while suicide assistance was widely prohibited.'
In the past two-and-a-half years, the distinction has rapidly eroded.
Although voters in Washington and California rejected referenda that
* Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Law and Health, Indiana University
School of Law-Indianapolis. A.B., Brandeis, 1977; M.D., Harvard, 1981; J.D., Harvard, 1986.
An earlier version of this article appeared as David Orentlicher, The Legalization of Physician
Assisted Suicide, 335 New ENG, j. Men. 663 (1996). Portions of that article are included here with
the permission of the New England journal of Medicine.
3 By withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, I refer to situations in which physicians discon-
tinue the provision of medical treatment that is necessary to sustain a patient's life. Such treatment
includes ventilators, feeding tubes, cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), surgery, antibiotics,
blood transfusions and any other health care. To be precise, life-sustaining treatment may he
withdrawn or withheld.
2
 By physician-assisted suicide, I refer primarily to situations in which physicians provide
patients with a lethal dose of a drug, and the patients take the drug immediately or at a later
date to end their lives. Physician-assisted suicide would also cover situations in which a physician
provides a patient with some other death-causing agent that the patient uses to commit suicide.
Dr. jack Kevorkian has used carbon monoxide to assist the suicides of most of his patients.
3 See 2 ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT To DIE 450-57 (2d ed. 1995); Choice In Dying, Inc., State
Laws Regarding Assisted Suicide, 1995 RIGIEE-•O-DIE LAW DIG. 40,56.
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would have legalized assisted suicide in 1991 4 and 1992,5
 respectively,
voters in Oregon enacted the first statute in the United States author-
izing assisted suicide in November 1994.6
 The Michigan Supreme Court
held in December 1994 that Dr. Jack Kevorkian could be criminally
prosecuted for assisting patients with suicide, 7 but, in the spring of
1996, two juries acquitted him of charges in four casess; no further
charges have been brought even though he assisted his twenty-eighth
suicide while on trial'' and has assisted several more suicides since
then. 1° Finally, and most strikingly, the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Ninth" and Second' 2
 Circuits recognized a constitutional right
to assisted suicide for the first time in March and April 1996, respec-
tively. As the law abandons the distinction between withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment and assisting suicide, it seems that the law is un-
dergoing a profound .change."
This reading of the law is mistaken, however. Rather than a shift in
the law, we are seeing the further development of the principles that have
driven right-to-die law since the Quinlan case" in 1976. For the same
reasons that the law drew a distinction between treatment withdrawal and
suicide assistance in the past, the law is now eliminating that distinction.
See Jane Gross, Voters 'Ran Down Merry Killing Idea, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at B16.
5 See Sandi Dolbee, Right-to-Die Measure Rejected by State Voters; Lack of Safeguards a Major
Factor, Opponents Believed, SAN DIEGO UNION-1R18., Nov. 4, 1992, at AS.
5 Oregon Death with Dignity Act, 1995 OR. LAWS ch. 3 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800
(1996)); see Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo, Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon: A Bold Experiment,
274 JAMA 483 (1995) (discussing implications of Oregon statute). The statute has been under a
federal court injunction and therefore has not yet gone into effect. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F.
Supp. 1439 (D. Or. 1995).
7 People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995).
SeeJack Lessenberry, fury Acquits Kevorkian in Common -Law Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1996,
at A14; Tamar Lewin, Ruling Sharpens Assisted -Suicide Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1996, at A14.
9
 See Kevorkian Back at Thal as Talk of Detroit Is of Another Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1996,
at A16.
I° See Dr: Kevorkian Helps in Woman's Suicide, 3d Case in 9 Days, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1996,
at A18; Kevorkian Held Briefly After 2d Suicide in Day, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1996, at A15; Jack
Lessenberry, New Official in Quandary on Trying Kevorkian, N.Y. TuktEs, Nov. 10, 1996, at A21.
Indeed, Richard Thompson, the prosecutor who brought the unsuccessful charges, was voted out
of office in a "primary election that was widely seen as a referendum on his handling of the issue
of assisted suicide." Prosecutor of Kevorkian Loses Re
-election Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1996, at A23.
11 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) cert. granted
subnom. Washington u. Glucksberg 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
P2 Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996).
15
 According to two commentators, for example, efforts to gain recognition of a right to
assisted suicide are "efforts . not only to transform the law, but also to transform society." Mark
E. Chopko & Michael F. Moses, Assisted Suicide: Still a Wonderful Life?, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
519, 523 (1995).
14 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (finding right to refuse life-sustaining treatment
in case involving permanently unconscious 21-year-old woman whose parents wanted to have her
ventilator withdrawn).
May 19971	 PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE 	 445
I will argue that physician assisted suicide has been prohibited not
because it is meaningfully different from withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment, but because the distinction between suicide assistance and
treatment withdrawal served as a useful proxy for distinguishing be-
tween morally acceptable and morally unacceptable decisions by pa-
tients to end their lives. Society commonly implements its principles
through generally valid rules rather than through case-by-case deter-
minations, recognizing that the rules will not fit every case perfectly
but also recognizing the infeasibility of case-by-case determinations.
The distinction between suicide assistance and treatment withdrawal is
an example of rule-based decisionmaking that, in the view of the public
and the courts, was an effective way to ensure that patients could end
their lives only when they were morally justified in doing so.
Now, however, the distinction between physician assisted suicide
and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment has lost its utility as a moral
proxy. With recent advances in medical treatment, there are many
patients desiring assisted suicide whose wishes to end their lives are
morally justified—in society's view. The distinction between assisted
suicide and withdrawal of treatment no longer does a good job of
sorting morally valid from morally invalid requests by patients to end
their lives. Accordingly, the distinction is being replaced—and may
continue to be replaced—by new proxy distinctions that allow for
physician assisted suicide in limited situations.
It is not my intent to argue that physician assisted suicide is, or is
not, justified; much has already been written as to whether there ought
to be a constitutional's' or statutory 16 right to assisted suicide. Rather,
my aim is to explain why the law is beginning to recognize a right of
15 See, e.g., Chopko & Moses, supra note 13, at 545-78 (arguing against constitutional right);
Yale Kamisar, When Is There a Constitutional "Right to Die"? When Is There No Constitutional Tight
to Livel, 25 GA. L. REV. 1203 (1991) (arguing against constitutional right); Thomas J. Marzen,
"Out, Out Brief Candle": Constitutionally Prescribed Suicide for the Terminally Ill, 21 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 799 (1994) (arguing against constitutional right); Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional
Challenges to Bans on "Assisted Suicide": The View fi um Without and Within, 21 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 777 (1994) (arguing in favor of constitutional right); Symposium, Physician-Assisted Suicide,
35 Due. L. REV. 1 (1996); Kathryn L. Tucker & David J. Burman, Physician Aid in Dying: A
Humane Option, a Constitutionally Protected Choice, 18 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 495 (1995)
(arguing in favor of constitutional right).
in See, e.g., Charles H. Baron et al., A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate Physician
-As-
sisted Suicide, 33 Ha RV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1996) (proposing model statute to legalize assisted suicide);
Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physician
-Assisted Suicide: Creating a Regu-
latory Potemkin Village, 30 U. Rion. L. Rt:v. 1 (1996) (arguing against statutory right); Franklin
Miller et al., Regulating Physician -Assisted Death, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 119 (1994) (arguing in
favor of statutory right); Julia Pugliese, Note, Don't Ask—Don't Tell: The Secret Practice of Physi-
cian
-Assisted Suicide, 44 Hawn:4os L. J. 1291,1324-29 (1993) (proposing a statutory approach to
legalizing assisted suicide).
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patients to physician assisted suicide after a long history of denying
such a right and, in particular, why the law has recognized a right to
assisted suicide only for terminally ill persons.' 7
 Whatever one thinks
about a right to assisted suicide, the law is starting to acknowledge such
a right, and it is critical to understand the factors that are driving this
change in the law. 18
In Part I, I will demonstrate that the law's distinction between
suicide assistance and treatment withdrawal cannot be explained by
any of the traditional moral arguments used to distinguish the two acts.
In Part II, I will show how the distinction previously served a useful
proxy role for the moral concerns that underlie right-to-die law and
how that proxy role has become outdated. In Part III, I will discuss how
the recognition of a right to assisted suicide for terminally ill persons
brings right-to-die law back into congruence with its underlying moral
concerns. In Part IV, I will consider the likelihood that the law will
further expand the right-to-die to include assisted suicide for patients
who are not terminally ill and/or to include euthanasia.
I. THE ABSENCE OF A MEANINGFUL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ASSISTED
SUICIDE AND WITHDRAWAL OF TREATMENT
The distinction between treatment withdrawal and suicide assis-
tance has generally been justified by courts and scholars on the ground
that there is an important moral difference between the two acts.
17 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1996) (en bane);
Quill, 80 F.3d at 731; see also OR. Ray. STAT. § 2.01 (Supp. 1996). The Compassion in Dying court
found a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to assisted suicide for terminally
ill persons by relying on the United States Supreme Court's recognition of constitutional protec-
tion for "intimate and personal choices" that are "central to personal dignity and autonomy,"
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 813 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992)), and on the Supreme Court's recognition of "a liberty interest in hastening one's own
death" in Crtaan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing
constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment). Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 816. The
Quill court rejected a substantive due process right to assisted suicide, Quill, 80 F.3d at 723-25,
and instead found a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment when a state
permits terminally ill persons "to hasten their deaths" by refusing life-sustaining treatment but
forbids other terminally ill persons "to hasten death by self-administering prescribed drugs" when
those other persons are similarly situated except for not being dependent on life-sustaining
treatment. Id. at. 729.
18
 My argument assumes that the relevant constitutional provisions are sufficiently indeter-
minate that courts could reasonably conclude either that there is or is not a constitutional right
to assisted suicide. Indeed, a three-member panel of the Ninth Circuit found nu constitutional
right, only to be reversed by the en bane court. Compare Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49
F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995) (panel decision), with Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 836-37 (reversing
panel decision). As to statutes regarding assisted suicide, the issue is even simpler since only a
majority vote of the public or a legislature is needed to define the law.
I.
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However, close examination indicates that the distinction between
withdrawal and suicide rests on other grounds.
A. Conceptual Arguments to Explain the Distinction Between
Treatment Withdrawal and Suicide Assistance
I. Physician Assisted Suicide is an Act of Killing
Perhaps the most common justification for the distinction be-
tween treatment withdrawal and suicide assistance is that suicide assis-
tance involves an act of killing, whereas treatment withdrawal permits
the patient's disease to take its natural course. This justification ap-
pears in numerous court decisions and academic writings.'" According
to the New Jersey Supreme Court, for example:
Declining life-sustaining medical treatment may not properly
be viewed as an attempt to commit suicide. Refusing medical
intervention merely allows the disease to take its natural course;
if death were eventually to occur, it would be the result,
primarily, of the underlying disease, and not the result of a
self-inflicted injury. 2"
However, as the Second 21 and Ninth2
 Circuits observed, treatment
withdrawal is no less a killing than suicide. If I were to enter an
19
 See, e.g., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, GUIDELINES FOR STATE COURT DECISION
MAKING IN LIFE-SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT CASES 145 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter Gutoc-
uNEs]; Chopko & Moses, supra note 13, at 533-34; David Orendicher, Physician Participation in
Assisted Suicide, 262 JAMA 1844, 1845 (1989). The National Center for State Courts has stated:
There are significant moral and legal distinctions between letting die (including
the use of medications to relieve suffering during the dying process) and killing
(assisted suicide/euthanasia). In letting die, the cause of death is seen as the
underlying disease process or trauma. In assisted suicide/euthanasia, the cause of
death is seen as the inherently lethal action itself.
GUIDELINES, supra, at 145.
20
 in re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (NJ. 1985) (involving right of 84-year-old woman who
was bedridden and severely demented to have feeding tube withdrawn); see also Gray v. Romeo,
697 F. Supp. 580, 589 (D.R.I. 1988) (addressing right of 47-year-old woman who was permanently
unconscious from cerebral hemorrhage to have feeding tube withdrawn—"fT)here is an obvious
distinction between deliberately ending a life by artificial means and allowing nature to take its
course."); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 955-56 (Me. 1987) (addressing right of 24-year-old man
who was permanently unconscious from motor vehicle accident to have feeding tube withdrawn—
"[T] he cause of his death will be not his refusal of care but rather his accident and his resulting
medical condition."); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426
n.11 (Mass. 1977) (addressing right of profoundly mentally retarded 67-year-old man to have
chemotherapy withheld for leukemia that would respond poorly to treatment—"[T]o the extent
that the cause of death was from natural causes the patient did not set the death producing agent
in motion,").
21 Quill. 80 F.3d at 730.
22 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 822.
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intensive care unit and shut off every patient's ventilator, I would be
charged with murder for every patient who died. And, it would be no
defense that the patients' deaths were caused by their underlying
illnesses." It is of course true that I would have acted without consent,
whereas withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment typically occurs with
patient or proxy consent. However, whether or not there is consent
does not change the cause of the patient's death; it only serves to justify
the killing of the patient. 24
Although we could call withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment
justifiable homicide, we do not do so. Calling the act "withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment" makes the act more palatable, just as con-
cerns of palatability have led us to discard the term passive euthanasia
in favor of withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. 25 Nevertheless, that
we use the term "withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment" rather than
"justifiable homicide" does not change the causation analysis. The
issue, then, is not whether assisted suicide causes death but whether it
is a justifiable way to cause death.
Moreover, if causation were really the issue, assisted suicide would
be less problematic morally than withdrawal of treatment. With assisted
suicide, the physician has an attenuated causal role in the patient's
death. 26 The physician may provide a lethal dose of a drug, but because
the patient must self-administer the drug, the patient brings about his
or her own death. Indeed, when a physician writes a prescription for
a lethal dose of barbiturates that are used a few weeks or months later
in a suicide, the physician has a more attenuated role in the patient's
death than the physician whose discontinuation of a ventilator leads
to death in minutes.
The routine use of the argument that assisted suicide involves a
killing seems to reflect a failure by courts and commentators to distin-
guish between the act that causes a patient's death and the circum-
23 See Dan W. Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 22(2) HASTINGS CENTER REP. 10, 13
(1992); Giles R. Scofield, Exposing Some Myths About Physician-Assisted Suicide, 18 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 473, 480 (1995).
24 See Brock, supra note 23, at 13; Note, Physician-assisted Suicide and the Right to The with
Assistance, 105 HARv. L. REV. 2021, 2029-30 (1992).
25 Originally, withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment was generally characterized as passive
euthanasia, as distinguished from active euthanasia, In active euthanasia, a physician or other
person would inject a lethal drug into a patient or otherwise administer a lethal agent. See William
E. May et al., Feeding and Hydrating the Permanently Unconscious and Other Vulnerable Persons, 3
IssuEs L & MED. 203, 204 (1987); John A. Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns:
A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. Rev. 213, 214-15 & n.16 (1975).
26 See Quill, 80 F.3d at 729,
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stances under which the act is performed. In rejecting a right to
assisted suicide, the Michigan Supreme Court wrote:
We agree that persons who opt to discontinue life-sustaining
medical treatment are not, in effect, committing suicide. There
is a difference between choosing a natural death summoned
by an uninvited illness or calamity, and deliberately seeking
to terminate one's life by resorting to death-inducing meas-
ures unrelated to the natural process of dying. 27
While there is a difference between the two situations, the impor-
tant difference may lie in the fact that one person is suffering from
an "uninvited illness or calamity," not that the other person is
"resorting to death-inducing measures."
The Michigan court's concern about the "naturalness" of death is
not helpful in distinguishing treatment withdrawal from suicide assis-
tance. Patients who have received artificial ventilation, kidney dialysis
or cancer chemotherapy for their disease are no longer able to die a
"natural" death. A natural death occurs only when a person has re-
ceived no treatment for her disease. Accordingly, patients who die
when treatment is withdrawn also die an unnatural death. Moreover,
the court is assuming that we can locate the appropriate "baseline" for
the patient by looking at the patient without treatment. However, it is
just as reasonable to take the patient's baseline as where the patient is
with treatment. For example, I think we would want to say that, when
a person has had an artificial heart valve or a cardiac pacemaker
implanted, the patient is now at a new baseline in terms of her physical
condition.
2. Suicide Assistance Kills the Healthy as Well as the Sick
Daniel Callahan, an eminent scholar in medical ethics, maintains
that we distinguish between suicide assistance and treatment with-
drawal because ceasing treatment kills only if the patient is suffering
from a fatal illness, whereas assisting suicide kills both the sick and the
healthy person.28
 Edmund Pellegrino, a distinguished physician-ethicist,
has advanced a similar argument to distinguish withdrawal of life-sustain-
ing treatment from assisted suicide; he observes that when patients are
27
 People v. Kevorkian, 527 N,W,2d 714, 728-29 (Mich. 1994).
28 Daniel Callahan, When Self-Determination Runs Amok, 22(2) 1-1AsTiNGS CENTER REP. 52, 53
(1992).
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"overmastered" by disease, life-sustaining treatment serves "no bene-
ficial purpose," and physicians "have a moral obligation to stop treat-
ment."29
These claims do not survive scrutiny. Callahan's and Pellegrino's
arguments reflect the considerations that originally led society to ac-
knowledge a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. While that right
is now well-entrenched, it was not always clear that withdrawal of
treatment was permissible. Twenty years ago, Karen Quinlan's fam-
ily had to obtain a landmark decision by the New Jersey Supreme
Court before her ventilator could be withdrawn." Thirteen years
ago, in Barber v. Superior Court, two physicians were prosecuted
for withdrawing life-sustaining treatment at the behest of the pa-
tient's family; the physicians needed an appellate court decision to
have the murder charges vacated. 3 ' At some point, society had to
decide whether treatment withdrawal was an unlawful killing, and it
declined to do so primarily because we think it is morally permissible
to let patients die when they are hopelessly ill and have little to gain
from treatment.
This justification for permitting withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ment can be found in court decisions, state statutes, religious writings
and academic commentaries. For example, in explaining why Elizabeth
Bouvia's right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration superseded
the state's interest in preserving her life, a California court of appeals
observed that Ms. Bouvia faced a life of "painful existence," that her
"condition [was] irreversible" and that she had no choice but to lie
"physically helpless subject to the ignominy, embarrassment, humili-
ation and dehumanizing aspects created by her helplessness."32 Simi-
larly, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court wrote:
There is a substantial distinction in the State's insistence that
human life be saved where the affliction is curable, as op-
posed to the State interest where, as here, the issue is not
whether but when, for how long, and at what cost to the
individual that life may be briefly extended. Even if we assume
that the State has an additional interest in seeing to it that
individual decisions on the prolongation of life do not in any
2'J Edmund D. Pellegrino, Doctors Must Not mg 3 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 95, 96 (1992).
5" In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
51
 Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. App. 1983) (involving right of comatose
patient to have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn).
sz Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Ct. App. 1986) (involving right of
28-year-old woman afflicted with severe cerebral palsy to refuse life-sustaining treatment).
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way tend to "cheapen" the value which is placed in the con-
cept of living, ... we believe it is not inconsistent to recognize
a right to decline medical treatment in a situation of incur-
able illness."
Living will statutes typically state that it is permissible to discontinue
treatment when the treatment serves only "to prolong the dying
process."34 The Roman Catholic Church, in its 1980 Declaration on
Euthanasia countenancing withdrawal of treatment, concluded:
[W] hen inevitable death is imminent in spite of the means
used, it is permitted in conscience to make the decision to
refuse forms of treatment that would only secure a precarious
and burdensome prolongation of life, so long as the normal
care due to the sick person in similar cases is not inter-
rupted."
Norman Cantor, a leading scholar on end-of-life law, justifies with-
drawal of life-sustaining treatment because the patient is "not intent
on repudiating life, but on avoiding a prolonged, undignified dying
process." 36
All of this suggests that the relevant issue is whether the person is
dying and beyond help, not whether the person dies by treatment
withdrawal or suicide assistance. Under this view, it should be accept-
able to assist the suicide of a dying patient and unacceptable to with-
draw life-sustaining treatment if a patient is not irreversibly ill.
3. Suicide Assistance Violates the Physician's Professional Role
Leon Kass, a leading scholar of medicine and philosophy, argues
that assisted suicide is fundamentally inconsistent with the physician's
role as a healer. 37 Physicians serve patients not simply to facilitate
"Superintendant of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425-26 (Mass.
1977).
" See, e.g., No. CODE ANN. § 16-36-4-1(a) (2) (Michie Supp. 1996); see also CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7186.5 (West Supp. 1996) (allowing witdrawal of treatment if it "only prolongs
the process of dying or the irreversible coma or persistent vegetative state"); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.303(1) (West Supp. 1997) (allowing witdrawal of treatment if it serves "only to prolong
artificially the process of dying").
" THE PARK RIDGE CENTER, ACTIVE EUTHANASIA, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC DEBATE 51
(1991).
313 Norman L. Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy, and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30
RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 249-50 (1977).
37 See Leon R. Kass, Neither for Love nor Money: Why Doctors Must Not Kill, 94 Pun. 1NTEREsT
25, 30 (1989).
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patient autonomy but to provide medical treatments that make pa-
tients as well as they can become. Under this view of the physician's
role, treatment that is designed to cause death is not part of the
medical armamentarium and therefore must not be provided." More-
over, if physicians began to dispense death-causing agents, patients
would develop a profound distrust of the medical profession. It would
no longer be clear that physicians were wholeheartedly devoted to
caring for patient health" or to protecting life "in all its frailty." 40
There are three responses to this important argument against
assisted suicide. First, physicians are providers of comfort as fundamen-
tally as they are healers of illness. 41
 When these two roles conflict, it is
not clear why the healing role should take priority over the comforting
role. Indeed, if we view physicians' fundamental role as relieving dis-
comfort or disease, with health promotion being a part of that role,
then assisting suicide is not only compatible with the physician's role
but quite possibly incumbent upon physicians. Under this view, what
breeds mistrust toward physicians by patients is not that physicians may
dispense lethal agents but that they may not do so. 42 Patients fear that
when they are suffering intolerably, they will be denied the drugs that
are necessary to end their suffering. 45
Second, even accepting the premise that healing is the fundamen-
tal physician role, permitting assisted suicide can facilitate that role.
While assisted suicide will shorten some patients' lives, it will prolong
" See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Physician As-
sisted Suicide, 10 ISSUES L. & MED. 91, 93 (1994); Willard Gaylin et al., Doctors Must Not Kill,'
259 JAMA 2139, 2139 (1988); Kass, supra note 37, at 30.
39 See Chopko & Moses, supra note 13, at 527; Orentlicher, supra note 19, at 1845.
40 Gaylin et al., supra note 38, at 2140.
41 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Euthanasia: Historical, Ethical, and Empiric Perspectives, 154 Mt-
CHIVE INTERNAL MED. 1890, 1893 (1994); Robert F. Weir, The Morality of Physician-Assisted Suicide,
20 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 116, 123 (1992).
42 See MARGARET P. BAITIN, ETHICAL ISSUES IN SUICIDE 206 (1995).
43 See Christine K. Cassel & Diane E. Meier, Morals and Moralism in the Debate Over Euthanasia
and Assisted Suicide, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 750, 751 (1990). In a survey of adult patients,
researchers found that 90.5% of the patients would consider a physician who assisted suicides to
be as trustworthy as other physicians in providing care to critically ill patients. See Mark A. Graber
et al., Patients' Views About Physician Participation in Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 11 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 71, 73 (1996) (studying 228 patients at single university-based family practice
program). In another study, researchers asked relatives of deceased persons whether the dece-
dents would have wanted their physicians to provide them with a lethal dose of pills when they
were dying. In 17% of cases, the decedent would have wanted a lethal dose of pills. Importantly,
in only 8% of cases did the family members report that the decedent found comfort measures
inadequate.• See Jay A. Jacobson et al., Decedents' Reported Preferences for Physician-Assisted Death:
A Survey of Informants Listed on Death Certificates in Utah, 6 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 149, 153
-55
(1995) (studying 37% of all adult deaths in Utah other than suicides between July and Novem-
ber 1992).
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other patients' lives. What patients often want from the right to assisted
suicide is not so much the ability to die but the knowledge that they
will always have control over the timing of their death." Accordingly,
they may be more willing to undergo aggressive medical treatments
that are painful and risky. If the treatments do not succeed but only
worsen the patients' condition, the patients would be assured that they
could end their suffering. Without such assurance, they might well
forgo the treatments entirely.
Patient control over the timing of death may also prolong life
because any feelings of ambivalence are likely to stay the patient's
hand. 4' When death occurs by withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment,
residual ambivalence may not deter the patient. Patients recognize that
hesitation at the scheduled time of discontinuation might cause their
physicians to question the sincerity of any later decision to stop treat-
ment and therefore preclude discontinuation at a later time. 46
Finally, we cannot explain the distinction between assisted suicide
and treatment withdrawal in terms of the physician's healing role
because we permit physicians to act in ways that are inconsistent with
healing through the withdrawal of treatment. Physicians can withdraw
life-sustaining treatment when the patient will likely live for many more
years and even when there is a good possibility of significant improve-
ment in the patient's condition. 41 Yet, if physicians were guided by
whether their proposed actions would serve to heal, they would not
remove life-sustaining treatment from patients who could be healed.
Thus, even if there is merit to the argument about the physician's
healing role, it does not explain the distinction between assisted sui-
cide and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.
4. If Physicians Treated Patients' Pain Appropriately, Patients Would
No Longer Ask for Assisted Suicide
As opponents of assisted suicide have observed, many physicians
do not treat their patients' pain aggressively enough, and greater use
44 See Brock, supra note 23, at 11.
45 See Howard Brody, Assisted Death—A Compassionate Response to a Medical Failure, 327 NEW
ENG. j. MED. 1384, 1386 (1992).
46A similar argument could be made about physician-assisted suicide. However, an important
difference between suicide assistance and treatment withdrawal is the fact that patients can end
their lives by suicide privately without the presence of a physician. See, e.g., Timothy E. Quill,
Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324 NEW ENG. J. Man. 691, 693
(1991) (describing how patient dying of leukemia ended her life alone, two days after saying
goodbye to her physician).
47 See, e.g., Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990) (recognizing right of 36-year-old
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of pain medications and hospice care can alleviate a patient's desire to
die." Still, not all physical pain can be treated. Further, suffering comes
in forms other than physical pain, whether it be the wasting of the body
into little more than flesh and bones, the loss of control over bodily
functions and the utter dependence on others, the unrelieved mental
and physical exhaustion, or the knowledge that things will only get
worse. Indeed, one of Dr. Kevorkian's patients was a physician who
specialized in rehabilitative medicine and therefore had special exper-
tise in treatments and services to relieve patient suffering." Greater
use of palliative care would reduce the demand for assisted suicide, but
it will not eliminate the demand."
There is, however, an even more fundamental problem with this
argument; it applies equally to patients' desires for withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment. Their pain and suffering, too, could be alleviated
to a considerable extent if greater use were made of pain medications
and hospice care. Indeed, this concern led the Nevada Supreme Court
to recognize a state interest in "encouraging the charitable and hu-
mane care of afflicted persons" in cases involving the withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment.51
 According to the court, before a patient
could refuse life-sustaining treatment, the patient would have to be
"fully inform {edi . . . of the care alternatives . . . available." 52
5. People May Reject Burdensome Treatment but Not a
Burdensome Life
Some commentators have drawn a distinction between a patient's
rejecting the burdensomeness of medical treatment and a patient's
rejecting the burdensomeness of life." According to these commenta-
tors, it is permissible to decline life-sustaining medical treatment be-
cause the patient is avoiding the imposition of an external burden.
With assisted suicide, the patient is avoiding life itself.
adult with serious bleeding during cesarean section to refuse blood transfusions that could restore
her to good health).
48 See Chopko & Moses, supra note 13, at 531-32.
49 See Don 'Ferry, While Out on Bail, Kevorkian Attends a Doctor's Suicide, N.Y. Trms, Nov. 23,
1993, at Al.
5° See Robert J. Miller, Hospice Care as an Alternative to Euthanasia, 20 L. MED. & HEALTH
CARE 127, 128 (1992).
51
 McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 628 (Nev. 1990) (involving 31-year-old man who was
quadriplegic and ventilator dependent from swimming accident).
52 Id.
53 See May et al., supra note 25, at 208.
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There are two problems with this distinction. First, many permit-
ted withdrawals of treatment represent a rejection of burdensome life
rather than burdensome treatment. 54
 An important example is the case
of Kenneth Bergstedt, who had been rendered quadriplegic and ven-
tilator dependent by a swimming accident." In that case, the Nevada
Supreme Court approved withdrawal of Mr. Bergstedt's ventilator, ac-
cepting Mr. Bergstedt's rationale that he feared that his life would
become undesirable once his terminally ill father died and was no
longer around to care for him."
Second, it is not meaningful to distinguish between the burden-
someness of treatment and the burdensomeness of life. When a per-
son's life is dependent on medical treatment, the only life the person
has is a life with the treatment; the life and the treatment are insepa-
rable. 57 Hence, when a person with chronic kidney failure can survive
only with thrice-weekly dialysis, and the person decides to refuse fur-
ther dialysis because life is no longer worth living on dialysis,"8
 the
person is simultaneously rejecting the burdensomeness of dialysis and
the burdensomeness of life. The person may still enjoy the intellectual
or spiritual side of his life, but his life is the totality of his intellectual,
spiritual and physical well-being, and he has come to the conclusion
that the disadvantages of his physical condition outweigh the advan-
tages of his mental condition.
6. Suicide Assistance Involves an Intent to Kill
Treatment withdrawal differs from suicide assistance, it is argued,
because the intent is to remove an undesired treatment, not to kill the
patient. Indeed, the patient may not die when life-sustaining treatment
u See Gilbert Med:tender, On Removing Food and Water: Against the Stream, 14(6) HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 11, 13 (1984).
55 See Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 620. Bergstedt was in essentially the same medical condition as
that of the actor Christopher Reeve since his equestrian accident. Bergstedt was able to read,
watch television, write poetry by orally operating a computer and move around in a wheelchair.
His quadriplegia was irreversible; on the other hand, he was not terminally ill. See id.
5" Id. at 624-25.
57
 Cf. Sanford H. Radish, Letting Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, 80 CAL. L. REV.
857, 867 (1992) (arguing that there is no moral difference between rejecting life-sustaining
treatment that is not desired and rejecting life-sustaining treatment when continued life is not
desired).
58
 In one study, researchers found that 11% of deaths in dialysis patients occurred as a result
of a patient's decision to discontinue treatment. See Steven Neu & Carl M. Kjellstrand, Stopping
Long- term Dialysis: An Empirical Study of Withdrawal of Life
-Supporting Treatment, 314 NEW ENG.
J. Minn. 14, 15, 17-18 (1986).
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is withdrawn. Despite her physicians' predictions that she would die
without ventilatory support, Karen Quinlan lived for nearly a decade
after her ventilator was withdrawn. 59
 As one court wrote:
(Pi eople who refuse life-sustaining medical treatment may
not harbor a specific intent to die; rather, they may fervently
wish to live, but to do so free of unwanted medical technology,
surgery, or drugs, and without protracted suffering.6°
Yet, as Dr. Kevorkian successfully argued to his juries, 61
 the same
claim can be made about assisted suicide. 62 Prescribing a lethal dose
of a drug is done not to kill the patient but to relieve the patient's
suffering. Moreover, the patient might not die. The patient might
decide not to take the pills after all, might take a sublethal dose of the
drug or might be revived before dying and then decide against sub-
sequent suicide attempts.
The intent argument also fails to distinguish between treatment
withdrawal and suicide assistance because many treatment withdrawals
reflect an intent to die. As discussed in the previous section, patients
often refuse life-sustaining treatment because they perceive their life
as burdensome and they therefore want to die. When physicians dis-
continue the life-sustaining treatment for these patients, they are doing
so to facilitate an intent to die.° It is true that the patients would want
59
 See Robert D. McFadden, Karen Ann Quinlan, 31, Dies; Focus of '76 Right to Die Case, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 1985, at Al. While the Quinlan case is routinely cited as an example of the
possibility that the patient will survive a removal of life-sustaining treatment, it is a misleading
example. After Karen Quinlan's family won the right to have her ventilator discontinued, her
physician and the hospital administration refused to comply with the decision of the New Jersey
Supreme Court. Rather than turning off the ventilator immediately and letting Ms. Quinlan die,
Ms. Quinlan's physician, Dr. Morse, spent the next five months "weaning" her from the ventilator
so she could breathe on her own. See GREGORY E. PENCE, CLASSIC CASES IN MEDICAL ETHICS
16-17 (2d ed. 1995).
6t) In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985) (citations omitted); see also Satz v. Perlmutter,
362 So. 2d 160, 162-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (*The testimony of Mr. Perlmutter . is that
he really wants to live, but to do so, God and Mother Nature willing, under his own power. This
basic wish to live, plus the fact that he did not self-induce his horrible affliction, precludes his
further refusal of treatment being classified as attempted suicide.").
61 See Jack Lessenberry, In Latest Suicide Thal, Kevorkian Asserts Duty as a Doctor, 'N.Y. TIMES,
May 4, 1996, at 10.
62 See George J. Annas, Physician -Assisted Suicide—Michigan's Temporary Solution, 20 OHIo
N.G. L. REV. 561, 568 (1993) (defending actions of Dr. Timothy E. Quill in prescribing lethal
dose of barbiturates to patient who was dying of leukemia on ground that "Quill intends to
alleviate the pain and suffering of his patients' final weeks or months of life").
t'Moreover, in many cases of treatment withdrawal, the physician may be harboring an
independent wish to see the patient die. Nevertheless, we do not limit withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment because of that possibility. See John Arras, News from the Circuit Courts: How Not to
Think About Physician-Assisted Suicide, BtoLesw, July–Aug. 1996, at 5171, S181.
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to live if they were not suffering from their illnesses or injuries, but the
same can be said for ill or injured patients who request assistance with
suicide.
In any event, arguments about intent cannot simply be asserted.
The law often holds people responsible for the foreseeable conse-
quences of their acts, even if they did not intend to cause those
consequences.r" If lack of intent is to excuse physicians from causing
their patients' deaths, we need an additional argument as to why lack
of intent ought to matter. If the argument for treatment withdrawal is
that patients cannot be required to stay. alive if they are experiencing
unacceptable suffering, then we are left with an argument that does
not distinguish between treatment withdrawal and assisted suicide.
7. Suicide Assistance Implies a Positive Right
Some commentators distinguish suicide assistance on the ground
that treatment refusal involves a negative right to be left alone while
suicide assistance implicates a positive right to command aid. This
argument mischaracterizes the nature of a right to assisted suicide. The
right does not mean that patients can insist that their physicians aid in
their suicides. Rather, the right requires that the state not interfere
when a patient and physician voluntarily agree on a course of assisted
suicide. Physicians would participate in assisted suicide only if they
were willing to do so, just as physicians perform abortions only if they
are willing to do so. A right to assisted suicide is thus a negative right
to be left alone. 65
Still, it is argued, the distinction between treatment withdrawal
and suicide assistance reflects the law's traditional protection against
unwanted physical touchings. 66 Imposition of unwanted medical treat-
ment is an unlawful battery. Denying someone the right to suicide
assistance does not result in a battery of any kind and therefore does
not implicate any rights that the person might have.
61 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER $C KEETON ON TtlF. LAW OP TORTS 280-300 (5th ed.
1984).
65 There is also the deeper point that the positive rights-negative rights distinction is not some
objective phenomenon but a social construct that presupposes some earlier assignment of rights.
The only reason why we can characterize the right to refuse treatment as a negative right is
because we have already decided that individuals enjoy certain rights of personal autonomy. If
we took the view that bodies belong to the larger community, with individuals serving a steward-
ship role over their bodies, then the right to refuse treatment would become a positive right.
Similarly, the right to keep people off one's property is a negative right only because there was
an earlier assignment of individual property rights. In a socialist state with no rights of private
ownership of property, the right to keep someone else off property would be a positive right.
66 See Scofield, supra note 23, at 478-79.
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There are two problems with this battery argument. First, the law
does not base rights in medical decision-making simply on whether a
battery is involved. There are a number of circumstances in which
courts and legislatures have imposed medical treatment on unwilling
persons. For example, the Supreme Court has upheld the right of the
state to require vaccination,67 state courts have ordered pregnant women
to accept medical treatment that would benefit their fetuses and them-
selves,68 and the Supreme Court has granted authority to prisons to
administer psychiatric medications to competent, mentally ill inmates
who pose a danger to themselves.° It is not only the case that some
unwanted physical touchings are permitted, it is also the case that there
are rights in medical decision-making when the person is seeking,
rather than rejecting, treatment. For example, individuals needing
emergency medical care have a right to receive such care at hospital
emergency rooms, whether or not they can pay for the care."
Even if we accept the fact that the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment implicates a right to be free from battery, this fact does not
help us understand the distinction between treatment withdrawal and
assisted suicide. Society recognizes a right to be free of unwanted
touchings to ensure that individuals have control over their bodies and
are able to exercise self-determination.n Yet, a right to assisted suicide
is also designed to ensure that individuals have control over their
bodies and are able to exercise self-determination. 72 We are still left
with the question of why considerations of personal autonomy are
more important with respect to treatment withdrawal than assisted
suicide.
67 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (involving man's refusal of smallpox
vaccine).
6" See Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 459-60 (Ga. 1981)
(involving ability of state to impose cesarean section on woman who was 39-weeks pregnant if
cesarean section was needed to prevent severe bleeding that would threaten lives of her fetus and
herself); In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1985) (involving refusal of
blood transfusions by woman who was 18-weeks pregnant and who had suffered severe gastroin-
testinal bleeding).
6" See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990). These cases can be distinguished, one
might argue, because the individual is a prisoner or is risking the health of a fetus or of other
persons. Nevertheless, they demonstrate that the individual's right to make medical decisions
turns on factors other than whether a battery has occurred.
70 See Owens v. Nacogdoches County Hosp. Dist., 741 F. Supp. 1269, 1281 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
One might also cite the right to abortion as an affirmative right to medical care and not a right
to be free from a battery. However, the right to abortion could be described as a right to ward
off the unwanted physical intrusion of a fetus.
71 See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (Cardozo, J.)
(holding that surgery without consent is unlawful assault because "[elvery human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body").
72 See Note, supra note 24, at 2026-28.
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B. Slippery Slope Arguments to Explain the Distinction Between
Treatment Withdrawal and Assisted Suicide
I. Risks to Vulnerable Patients
Even though we might imagine some justifiable cases of assisted
suicide, it is argued, there is too great a risk that vulnerable patients
will end their lives involuntarily or will succumb to pressures from
others to end their lives. Patients desiring assisted suicide may have
impaired competence from a treatable depression, and physicians re-
sponding to requests for suicide assistance are often inadequately trained
to distinguish rational requests from those driven by depression."
Patients may also have impaired competence from medication side-ef-
fects, or feel that they have a "duty to die" to spare their family the
financial and emotional burden of their continued life." Patients may
also choose to die because they have not received the kinds of pain
relief or support services that would make them willing to stay alive.
At a time when physicians do not treat physical or psychological pain
aggressively enough in their dying patients, 75 it would be dangerous for
patients to have the option of assisted suicide. Patients might choose
suicide for unrelieved pain and suffering that could, in fact, be relieved
with appropriate treatment.
These risks are real, but, as the Second Circuit observed," they
are just as real for patients who ask that their life-sustaining treatment
be withdrawn. Indeed, in State v. McAfee," a man who was left a ventila-
tor-dependent quadriplegic after a motorcycle accident sought—and
received judicial permission to discontinue his ventilator; he never
exercised his court-authorized right, however, in part because wide
publicity about his case brought forth support services that made his
life more worthwhile to him." That kind of publicity, however, is most
unusual.
Critics of assisted suicide observe that physicians may spend less
time treating their dying patients if assisted suicide is an option." It is
73 Yeates Conwell & Eric D. Caine, Rational Suicide and the Right to Die: Reality and Myth,
325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1100, 1]01 (1991).
74 See Yale Ktimisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, 23(3) HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 32, 39 (1993).
15 See Juurrit AHRONHEIM & DORON WEBER, FINAL PASSAGES: POSITIVE CHOICES FOR THE
DYING AND THEIR LOVED ONES 99-114 (1992); Kathleen M. Foley, Competent Care for the Dying
Instead of Physician
-Assisted Suicide, 336 NEw ENG. J. MED. 54, 55-56 (1997).
76 Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 730 (2d Cir. 1996).
77 State v. McAfee, 38.5 S.E.2d 6.51 (Ga. 1989).
78 See Associated Press, Larry McAfee, 39; Sought Right to Die, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1995, at 1723.
79
 See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Decisions Near
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emotionally draining and time consuming to provide appropriate com-
fort and other care to patients who are seriously ill, and physicians
often find it psychologically difficult to respond to the needs of these
patients. 8° If people can choose suicide, then physicians may see less
of a need to respond to their dying patients' needs. This concern is
valid, but it also counsels against permitting the withdrawal of life-sus-
taining treatment. With the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment as
an option, physicians may also be discouraged from responding to the
needs of their dying patients. In short, while these are legitimate
concerns about physician assisted suicide, they do not explain the
distinction between assisted suicide and the withdrawal of life-sustain-
ing treatment.
Opponents also argue that it is too dangerous to allow assisted
suicide in a health care system that is increasingly becoming dominated
by managed cares' With insurers rewarding physicians and hospitals
for spending less on patients, fewer resources will be available for the
kinds of supportive care needed to relieve dying patients' suffering.
Patients, it is argued, will be driven to choose suicide when better care
would have caused them to change their minds. Yet, resource con-
straints are even more likely to cause premature withdrawals of life-sus-
taining treatment. Patients dependent on ventilators or dialysis con-
sume more resources than patients who are not so dependent, and
patients can live many more years, even decades, while being sustained
on artificial life supports. When the United States Supreme Court was
deciding whether to permit the withdrawal of Nancy Cruzan's feeding
tube, the costs of her care were reported to be more than $130,000
per year,82 and she survived nearly eight years in her persistent vegeta-
tive state before her treatment was discontinued. 83
2. The Netherlands Experience
It is argued that the Netherlands experience demonstrates the
reality of the slippery slope.'" In the Netherlands, assisted suicide and
the End of Life, 267 JAMA '2229, 2232 (1992); Seth F. Kreimer, Does Pro-Choice Mean Pro-Kevorkian?
An Essay on Roc, Casey, and the Right to Die, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 803, 826-28 (1995).
" See Steven H. Miles, Physicians and Their Patients' Suicides, 271 JAMA 1786, 1786 (1994).
8L See, e.g., Daniel P. Sulmasy, Managed Care and Managed Death, 155 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MEI). 133 (1995); Susan M. Wolf, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Context of Managed Care, 35
DUQ. L. REV. 455 (1996).
82 See William Robbins, Parents Fight for Right to Let a Daughter Die, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1989,
at 139.
8.1
	 Andrew H. Malcolm, Nang Cruzan: End to Long Goodbye, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1990,
at A8.
84 See CARI.OS F. GOMES, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE NETHER-
LANDS 135-39 (1991).
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euthanasia are technically illegal, but physicians can avoid prosecution
by adhering to strict guidelines. 8' Leading studies have found that in
about twenty-five percent of cases involving physician assisted suicide
or euthanasia, the strict procedural safeguards are not satisfied." This
is an important concern, and it has led the Netherlands to adopt more
stringent safeguards. 87
The Netherlands' experience may show that legalizing assisted
suicide and euthanasia would be problematic, but we cannot explain
the legal distinction in the United States between suicide assistance
and treatment withdrawal by pointing to the Netherlands' experience.
First, the legal distinction between suicide assistance and treatment
withdrawal predates the disclosure of data in the United States about
the Netherlands' experience. Second, the same problems exist in this
country with treatment withdrawals. Studies have consistently shown
that physicians do not comport with ethical principles when imple-
menting treatment withdrawals.M In a study of living wills, physicians
overrode a patient's treatment preference twenty-five percent of the
time, and, in three-quarters of those overrides, the physician withheld
treatment desired by the patient." Similarly, another study has shown
that physicians often write do-not-resuscitate orders without discussing
the matter with patients who still possess decision-making capacity."
Abuses of policy are a serious concern, but they do not explain why
this country has distinguished between suicide assistance and treat-
ment withdrawal. If such abuses are reason enough to condemn deci-
sions to shorten a patient's life, they should lead a person to oppose
both assisted suicide and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, but
not to oppose one and support the other.
More importantly, most of the abuse in the Netherlands involves
euthanasia of persons who lack decision-making capacity at the time
65 See Maurice A. M. de Wachter, Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 22(2) HASTINGS CENTER REP.
23, 23 (1992).
86
 See Paul J. van der Maas et al., Euthanasia, Physician Assisted Suicide and Other Medical
Practices Involving the End of Life in the Netherlands, 1990-1995,335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1699,
1701 (1996).
87 See Marlise Simons, Dutch Doctors to Tighten Rules on Mercy Killings, N.Y. Tisas, Sept. 11,
1995, at A3.
ss See David Orentlicher, The Limitations of Legislation, 53 Mn. L. Rit. 1255, 1280-1301
(1994); SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Thal to Improve Care for Seriously III
Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of
'Treatments (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591 (1995).
89 See Marion Danis at al., A Prospective Study of Advance Directives for Life-Sustaining Care,
324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 882, 884-85 (1991).
9° SeeAndrew L. Evans & Baruch A. Brody, The Do-Not-Resuscitate Order in Teaching Hospitals,
253 ,JAMA 2236, 2238 (1985). A do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order means dial no efforts will be
made to revive a patient who suffers a cardiac arrest (i.e., the heart stops beating).
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euthanasia is performed.'" While these cases involve patients who are
"near death and clearly suffering grievously," 92 and who often had
stated a preference for euthanasia before losing decision-making ca-
pacity," they are nevertheless very troubling. Still, what they demon-
strate are the risks of permitting euthanasia—not assisted suicide. With
a right to assisted suicide, the patient must perform the life-ending act;
accordingly, persons lacking decision-making capacity would not have
their lives ended by others inappropriately.
II. THE REAL BASIS FOR THE LEGAL DISTINCTION
BETWEEN SUICIDE AND WITHDRAWAL
In the preceding discussion, I have tried to demonstrate that none
of the traditional moral arguments can explain why the law has treated
withdrawal of treatment and assisted suicide differently. All of the
traditional arguments can be met by equally valid counter-arguments.
Yet, the law has distinguished suicide assistance from treatment with-
drawal, and that distinction needs to be explained. As discussed below,
I believe the distinction has rested in the fact that permitting treatment
withdrawal but not permitting assisted suicide has given physicians a
generally useful proxy for identifying morally valid and morally invalid
requests by patients for help in ending their lives. There may be no
meaningful difference between treatment withdrawal and assisted sui-
cide, but distinguishing the two has served a very important func-
tional role.
An example can illustrate how the distinction between suicide
assistance and treatment withdrawal has served a proxy role in the law.
There are two individuals, one of whom is twenty-eight years old, is
despondent from a recent romantic breakup and, because of an acute
asthma attack, is temporarily ventilator dependent. Other than the
91 See Johannes .J.M. van Delden et al., The Remmelink Sludy: Two Years Later, 23(6) HASTINGS
CENTER RF.p. 24, 24-25 (1993). Indeed, in some cases, the person never possessed decision
making capacity. See, e.g., GOMEZ, ,SUpra note 84, at 83-84 (describing case of newborn with Down
syndrome in which parents and physicians decided to withhold life-saving surgery needed to
correct an obstruction of child's intestinal tract and then to administer large doses of sedating
drug to ensure that child did not sutler). Note that Gomez's case is very close to an ethically
permissible case of "double effect," in which a physician administers morphine or another drug
to relieve a patient's pain, recognizing that the dose of drug needed to relieve suffering may also
be a lethal dose. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 77-82
(1983) (discussing principle of double effect).
92 van Delden et al., supra note 91, at 24.
93 See van der Maas et al., supra note 86, at 1701.
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asthma, this person is in good health. The other individual is eighty-two
years old, is wracked with pain from widely metastatic cancer and has
no more than a few weeks to live. Assume that both of these individuals
wish to end their lives, the twenty-eight-year-old by refusing the venti-
lator and the eighty-two-year-old by suicide. Under current law, the
twenty-eight-year-old may have the ventilator discontinued" while the
eighty-two-year-old generally lacks a right to suicide assistance.
Yet, in terms of the reasons why we recognize a right to refuse
life-sustaining treatment, it would be more justifiable for a physician
to assist the eighty-two-year-old's suicide than to accede to the twenty-
eight-year-old's refusal of the ventilator. As discussed, the right to
refuse life-sustaining treatment arose out of a sense that hopelessly ill
patients should be able to refuse treatment that provides little, if any,
benefit and merely prolongs the dying process.95 Society's interest in
preserving a patient's life becomes attenuated when there is little life
left to save, and treatment becomes burdensome rather than beneficial.
In the same way, society's interest in preserving the life of the eighty-
two-year-old becomes attenuated—the patient's remaining life is very
short and overcome by severe suffering. 9" Conversely, imposing a ven-
tilator on the twenty-eight-year-old would not result in the brief pro-
longation of a dying process but the long extension of a life that likely
would become very much valued by the patient. If we were to decide
these cases strictly on their own merits, we would probably permit
physicians to assist the suicide of the eighty-two-year-old but not permit
them to withdraw the ventilator from the twenty-eight-year-old.
Moreover, if the terminally ill eighty-two-year-old were the typical
case of suicide, and the twenty-eight-year-old patient with asthma the
typical case of treatment withdrawal, it is very likely that the law would
permit assisted suicide and prohibit withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ment. In such circumstances, suicides would generally occur when the
patient's desire for death was morally justified, and treatment with-
drawals would generally occur when the patient's desire for death was
94 See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
competent adult patient "has the right to refuse any medical treatment, even that which may save
or prolong her life"); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1226 (N.J. 1985) (holding that competent
patient's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment "would not be affected by her medical condition
or prognosis"); David Orentlicher, Physician-Assisted Dying: The Conflict with Fundamental Prin-
ciples of American Law, in MEDICINE UNBOUND: THE HUMAN BODY AND THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL.
INTERVENTION 256, 263-64 (Robert. H. Blank & Andrea L. Bonnicksen eds., 1994) ("[T]he right
to refuse life-sustaining treatment is not limited by the patient's prognosis or the medical treat,
ment being provided.").
95 See supra text accompanying notes 30-36.
96
 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 /7.3d 790, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1996) (en bane).
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not morally justified. Indeed, in the few cases in which a patient has
been denied the right to refuse a life-sustaining treatment, the patient
typically has been a young person who could readily be restored to
good health.° Although we think of assisted suicide as inherently worse
than withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, much of this sense reflects
the fact that the typical suicide is less justifiable than the typical with-
drawal of life-sustaining treatment. 98 The twenty-eight-year-old despon-
dent person is the kind of person whom we think about when we think
about suicide, 99
 and the eighty-two-year-old person with metastatic can-
cer better fits our profile of the typical withdrawal case.
The proxy role of the distinction between suicide assistance and
treatment withdrawal is illustrated by the effort of Jed Rubenfeld, a
leading constitutional law scholar, to explain the distinction by apply-
ing his understanding of the right of privacy. He has argued that the
right of privacy is not concerned with what acts the state is trying to
prohibit but with what effects the state's prohibition has on people's
lives." According to Rubenfeld, the right of privacy seeks to protect
individuals from laws that "tend to take over the lives of the persons
involved . . . direct a life's development along a particular avenue . .
[and] inform the totality of a person's life."I° 1
 In applying this under-
standing to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and suicide,
Rubenfeld observes that, although it is difficult to distinguish between
the acts of treatment withdrawal and suicide, "the two cases are utterly
dissimilar . [w] ith regard to what is produced.' 1102
 The patient denied
treatment withdrawal is forced into a "particular, . . rigidly stand-
ardized life: the life of one confined to a hospital bed, attached to
medical machinery, and tended to by medical professionals."" Ruben-
97 it is also true that these cases either were decided before the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment was established or were decided in part on the basis of other factors, including third
party interests or the integrity of the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Application of President &
Dirs. of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (requiring 25-year-old to
accept blood transfusion to treat severe blood loss from ruptured ulcer); Jefferson v. Griffin
Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 459-60 (Ga. 1981) (requiring pregnant woman to
accept cesarean section if needed to prevent severe bleeding that would threaten lives of her fetus
and herself); In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93, 97 (N.H. 1984) (requiring 36-year-old healthy prisoner to
accept forced feeding that would frustrate his efforts to starve himself to death to avoid potentially
lifelong incarceration); John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp. v. Heston, 279 A.2d 670, 673 (N.J. 1971)
(requiring 22-year-old to accept blood transfusion during surgery that was performed because
her spleen was ruptured in automobile accident).
98 SeeJames Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 New ENG. J. Men. 78, 80 (1975); Jed
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 E1ARV. L. Rev. 737, 794-96 (1989).
99 See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.2d at 821.
1 °°Rubenfeld, supra note 98, at 783-84.
1 ° 1 Id. at 784.
1 °2 1d. at 795.
1°31d.
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feld distinguishes suicide by contrasting treatment withdrawal with the
"'ordinary' suicide," where a prohibition on suicide "does not, as a
rule, direct lives into a particular, narrowly defined course."'" Ruben-
feld's explanation works only because it contrasts the typical case of
withdrawal with the "ordinary" case of suicide. However, it does not
work if we consider patients desiring suicide who are confined to a
hospital bed and tended to by medical professionals (albeit not at-
tached to medical machinery).
This discussion suggests that ideally we would permit some with-
drawals of life-sustaining treatment and some assisted suicides but
prohibit other treatment withdrawals and other assisted suicides. Each
case would be judged on its own merits. In each case, a physician or
someone else would decide whether the patient's decision that life is
no longer worth living is a decision that society should respect.
However, it would be cumbersome and unwieldy to make that kind
of individual judgment for each potential withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment and each assisted suicide. Every request for a do-not-resus-
citate order would have to be individually assessed as would every
refusal of a ventilator, feeding tube, dialysis, or any other life-sustaining
treatment. More importantly, some representative of the state would
need to have authority for deciding whether the withdrawal or the
suicide should be permitted. It is not likely an authority that physicians
or other persons would welcome, nor is it an authority that we would
likely trust to physicians or other representatives of the state.'° 5 Judg-
ments as to when a person's life has insufficient value is a judgment
that can be made only by individuals for themselves."'" Accordingly,
while the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment once was viewed as
existing only when society deemed a patient's prognosis as suitably dim
and deemed a patient's care as particularly burdensome,'" 7 it has now
become a right of virtually any patient to refuse virtually any treat-
ment.' 08
104 Id.
105 See Callahan, supra note 28, at 55.
1°6 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 15-11, at 1367-68 (2d ed. 1988)
(observing that "having the state regularly make judgments about the value of a life" is "the worst
kind of state paternalism"). To he sure, decisions to withdraw life-sustaining treatment are made
for incompetent persons. There, however, it is generally a family member, friend or guardian who
decides on the person's behalf, not someone representing the state's interests.
107 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976) ("[T]he State's interest contra
weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and
the prognosis dims.").
1 °8 See supra note 94; see also George J. Annas, The "Right to Die" in America: Sloganeering
from Quinlan and Cruzan to Quill and Kevorkian, 34 Dug. L. REv. 875, 876 (1996); Edward R.
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Given the infeasibility of case-by-case judgments, we have relied
on the "bright line" distinction between withdrawal and assisted sui-
cide, a distinction that can be readily applied to specific cases and that
has generally given the results that would have occurred if we had
made individual assessments. For, in the vast majority of cases, with-
drawal of life-sustaining treatment has been morally acceptable, and,
at least until recently, the vast majority of assisted suicides have been
morally problematic. The typical withdrawal case has involved a patient
who is suffering greatly and will die shortly no matter what treatment
is provided. Moreover, in such cases, the side effects of the treatment
will likely outweigh the benefits. On the other hand, suicides frequently
involve relatively young persons, like actress Marilyn Monroe or Clin-
ton White House counsel Vincent Foster,'°° who lead seemingly pro-
ductive and fulfilling lives and who could, with time and therapy,
overcome their despondency and enjoy life for several more decades.
In short, the distinction between withdrawal and assisted suicide has
been based essentially on its usefulness as a proxy for distinguishing
morally acceptable from morally unacceptable cases of physician as-
sisted death. I am not making a normative judgment about whether
this is good ethics or good law. Rather, I am making a descriptive
judgment about why right-to-die law is as it is."°
Bright line rules are often used in ethics and the law. For example,
all persons gain the right to vote at age eighteen. We could undertake
a case-by-case assessment of adolescents to decide when they become
mature enough to vote. However, it would be terribly burdensome for
the government to make such judgments. Also, once we abandon
bright line rules for case-by-case determination, we increase the chances
of aggrievement among the public if people are treated differently
than others whom they believe they are like, or of abuse by decision-
makers. These are two reasons why the civil service has fixed salaries.
Society has also rejected case-by-case judgments with other kinds
of health care decisions. For example, when hemodialysis was first
developed to treat kidney failure there were not enough dialysis units
available to treat everyone in need, and thus dialysis was rationed on
a case-by-case basis. However, there was considerable discomfort with
Grant & Paul B. Linton, Relief or Reproach?: Euthanasia Rights in the Wake of Measure 16, 74 OR.
L. REV. 449, 460 (1995).
1 " Fifty-eight percent of all suicides in the United States in 1994 occurred among persons
younger than 45 years of age. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1996 964 (1995).
110
 Understanding why the law has drawn the distinction between assisted suicide and with-
drawal of life-sustaining treatment is critical to understanding how the law might evolve over time
in response to the debate over the legalization of assisted suicide.
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the decisions that were being made, particularly with the reliance by
decision-makers on considerations of social class and social worth.'"
As a result, legislation was passed in 1972 that made Medicare funds
available to cover kidney dialysis for virtually all patients with kidney
failure. 12 The Oregon Health Plan has also taken a categorical ap-
proach to decision-making in its effort to ration health care for indi-
viduals covered by the plan. Under the Oregon plan, Medicaid covers
fewer treatments than it did under Oregon's previous system, but it
provides coverage for a much broader range of uninsured persons."'
In deciding what would be covered, the Oregon Health Services Com-
mission ranked 696 different medical treatments in terms of benefit to
patients, and the legislature approved funding for all treatments at 565
or above in the ranking. 114 If a patient has an illness for which treat-
ment is covered, the funding is available regardless of the particular
patient's likelihood of benefitting from treatment. Variations among
patients in terms of the severity of their illnesses do not affect the
availability of coverage. Similarly, coverage is not affected by the pres-
ence of coexisting illnesses that may make the benefit from uncovered
treatments greater than usual or the benefit from covered treatments
smaller than usual." 5 Because of the difficulties with case-by-case judg-
ments, categorical judgments are often made instead.
III. BREAKING DOWN THE LEGAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN ASSISTED
SUICIDE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
In recent years, the usefulness of the distinction between treat-
ment withdrawal and assisted suicide has been undermined. There are
many terminally ill persons who are suffering intractably but who are
not dependent on life-sustaining treatment; a flat ban on assisted
suicide therefore prevents many suicides that can be justified in terms
of the considerations that are used to justify withdrawal of life-sustain-
ing treatment. If we assessed each case on its own merits, we would
find a significant number of persons desiring assisted suicide who have
comparable medical conditions and who have exactly the same reasons
for ending their lives as patients who request discontinuation of their
111 See Roger W. Evans et al., Implications for Health Care Policy A Social and Demographic
Profile of Hemodialysis Patients in the United States, 245 JAMA 487, 487 (1981).
"2 See id.
113 See Robert Steinbrook & Bernard Lo, The Oregon Medicaid Demonstration Project—Will It
Provide Adequate Medical Care?, 326 NEW ENG. j. MED. 340, 340 (1992).
111 See David Orentlicher, Destructuring Disability Rationing of Health Care and Unfair Dis-
crimination Against the Sick, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49, 54 n.21 (1996).
115 See Steinbrook & Lo, sutra note 113, at 342.
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life-sustaining treatment." 6 An opinion of the Ninth Circuit describes
two of these patients. The first was a plaintiff in the case:
Jane Roe is a 69-year-old retired pediatrician who has suffered
since 1988 from cancer which has now metastasized through-
out her skeleton. Although she tried and benefitted tempo-
rarily from various treatments including chemotherapy and
radiation, she is now in the terminal phase of her disease. . . .
Jane Roe has been almost completely bedridden since June
of 1993 and experiences constant pain, which becomes espe-
cially sharp and severe when she moves. The only medical
treatment available to her at this time is medication, which
cannot fully alleviate her pain. In addition, she suffers from
swollen legs, bed sores, poor appetite, nausea and vomiting,
impaired vision, incontinence of bowel, and general weak-
ness. 117
The second was a patient of a physician-plaintiff in the case:
One patient of mine, whom I will call Smith, a fictitious name,
lingered in the hospital for weeks, his lower body so swollen
from oozing Kaposi's lesions that he could not walk, his geni-
tals so swollen that he required a catheter to drain his bladder,
his fingers gangrenous from clotted arteries. Patient Smith's
friends stopped visiting him because it gave them nightmares.
Patient Smith's agonies could not be relieved by medication
or by the excellent nursing care he received. . . [H] e died
after having been tortured for weeks by the end-phase of his
disease. " 8
Oregon's statute and the decisions of the Second and Ninth Cir-
cuits were intended to reach patients like these. By redefining the right
to die to include assisted suicide for terminally ill persons, the two
circuit courts and Oregon ensure that patients who are hopelessly ill
and who realize little benefit from treatment are not forced to remain
alive against their wishes.
Our example of the twenty-eight-year-old and eighty-two-year-old
also illustrates how the distinction between treatment withdrawal and
suicide assistance has broken down. What is striking about that exam-
116 See Timothy E. Quill et al., Care of the Hopelessi5,
 Ill: Proposed Clinical Criteria for Physician-
Assisted Suicide, 327 NEN ENG. J. Man. 1380, 1380 (1992).
117 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 794.
118 Id. at 814.
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ple is the fact that the twenty-eight-year-old is not a very realistic exam-
ple of a withdrawal of treatment case while the eighty-two-year-old is a
reasonable example of a patient desiring physician assisted suicide. It
is very rare for relatively healthy, mentally competent young persons
to simultaneously become dependent on life-sustaining treatment and
so despondent that they want to end their lives. It is not so rare,
however, for a mentally competent older person to become terminally
ill and experience suffering that is so severe and intractable that the
person requests assisted suicide. Permitting withdrawal of treatment is
still a good proxy for allowing patients to end their lives when they
have morally justified reasons for wanting to do so. Denying assisted
suicide is no longer a good proxy for preventing patients from ending
their lives when they do not have morally valid reasons for wanting to
do so.
The opinions of the Second and Ninth Circuits and the language
of the Oregon statute indicate that their drafters were reformulating
the categories of permitted and prohibited patient dying to create
better proxies for justified and unjustified cases of patient death. The
decisions and the statute all retain a bright-line, categorical approach
to distinguishing between permissible and impermissible patient deaths:
all terminally ill patients may choose a lethal dose of medication
whether or not they are suffering greatly; neither the statute nor the
two decisions qualify their grant of a right to assisted suicide in terms
of the patient's degree of suffering. 119
 Conversely, no non-terminally ill
patients may choose to end their lives with a lethal dose of medication
even if they are suffering greatly. In addition, as before, all patients
who desire withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment may choose that
course whether or not they are suffering greatly. With the infeasibility
of case-by-case determinations, the Second and Ninth Circuits and
Oregon have chosen a new proxy to distinguish between permissible
and impermissible patient deaths. This new proxy essentially reflects
the view that the typical case in which a terminally ill patient desires
suicide is a case in which the patient's death is morally justifiable.m
119 See OR. REv. STAT. § 2.01 (1996 Supp.); Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731 (2d Cir. 1996);
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 793-94.
PS° Commentators have observed that physicians can never be certain that a patient is
terminally ill. Among patients certified for hospice coverage under Medicare as having a life
expectancy of less than six months, 15% survived for more than six months. See Nicholas A.
Chistakis & Jose J. Escarce. Survival of Medicare Patients After Enrollment in Hospice Programs, 335
NEW ENG..). MED. 172, 174 (1906). Accordingly, sonic patients may choose assisted suicide on
the mistaken impression that they have only a few months to live. This is a serious concern, and
it can be remedied to a large extent by limiting suicide assistance to cases in which predictions
of survival can he made with a high degree of certainty. Moreover, there is still no distinction
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Moreover, the statute and the court decisions reflect the sense that
what is critical for purposes of the patient's right to die is the patient's
condition rather than whether death comes by treatment withdrawal
or suicide. According to the Second Circuit, the state has little interest
"in requiring the prolongation of a life that is all but ended," in
requiring "the continuation of agony when the result is imminent and
inevitable" or in interfering "when the patient seeks to have drugs
prescribed to end life during the final stages of a terminal illness." 121
The court also found no meaningful distinction between treatment
withdrawal and suicide assistance, observing that "[t] he ending of life
by [withdrawal of life support] is nothing more nor less than assisted
suicide." 122 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the strength of the pa-
tient's right to hasten death is "especially" dependent on "the individ-
ual's physical condition" and is at its highest when the patient is
terminally ill and wishes to hasten death "because his remaining days
are an unmitigated torture."'" At the same time, "the state's interest
in preventing such individuals from hastening their deaths [is] of
comparatively little weight, but its insistence on frustrating their wishes
seems cruel indeed."'" Accordingly, the court wrote, "we see no ethical
or constitutionally cognizable difference between a doctor's pulling
the plug on a respirator and his prescribing drugs which will permit a
terminally ill patient to end his own life."'" Indeed, the Ninth Circuit
expressed doubt "that deaths resulting from terminally ill patients
taking medication prescribed by their doctors should be classified as
`suicide.'' 126
 Similarly, the Oregon statute expressly states that "[a]ctions
taken in accordance with [this Act] shall not, for any purpose, consti-
tute suicide, assisted suicide, mercy killing or homicide." 127
An important question is how the acquittals of Dr. Kevorkian fit
into my thesis. Many of the individuals whom Kevorkian has assisted
with suicide were not terminally ill, including two of the five persons
for whose deaths he was prosecuted. 128 Yet, he has always escaped
conviction. Kevorkian has not employed a categorical approach in
between assisted suicide and treatment withdrawal. Imprecise diagnoses are also a concern for
withdrawal of treatment. Patients may refuse life-sustaining treatment because they have mistak-
enly been told that they are terminally ill or that they will be dependent on artificial life support
for the rest of their lives.
121 Quip 80 F.3d at 729-30.
In Id. at 729.
126 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 834.
124
 Id. at 821.
In Id. at 824.
126 M.
127 OR. REv. STAT. § 3.14 (1996 Supp.) (emphasis added).
128 See Lessenberry, supra note 8.
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deciding whom he will assist with suicide; rather, he has engaged in
the kind of case-by-case determinations that I have argued are not
feasible.
Kevorkian's experience is consistent with my argument. As dis-
cussed earlier, the chief objection to case-by-case judgments is that
representatives of the state ought not to be making individualized
judgments as to when a person's life is of such poor quality that the
life no longer need be preserved. 129
 Kevorkian's case-by-case approach
has been accepted because he is not acting as a representative of the
state; indeed, he is viewed as an advocate of patients who feel thwarted
by the state. In addition, Kevorkian's acquittals suggest that the juries
believed he was employing a case-by-case approach in a reasonable
manner, and that he was making appropriate judgments as to whether
a person's desire for his assistance was a morally justified one. As long
as Kevorkian is perceived as acting in that way, he likely will continue
to escape punishment. However, if he starts to assist suicides in what
are viewed as morally unjustified cases, it is likely that he will be
repudiated by the public.'"
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN
RIGHT-TO-DIE LAW
If, as I argue, recognition of a right to physician assisted suicide
follows from the principles that have driven right-to-die law for the past
twenty years, will we also see further extensions of the right to die, as
opponents of assisted suicide predict?' 31
The answer to this question will depend on whether society ends
up with what it considers a good proxy when it permits anyone to reject
life-sustaining treatment but permits only terminally ill patients to
129 See supra text accompanying notes 105-15. In situations in which the state does make
individualized determinations about the value of people's lives, as with imposition of the death
penalty, it does so with procedures that are very formal and very deliberate. Indeed, it has become
the norm for inmates to spend a decade on death row before their execution. See Conference,
The Death Penalty in the Twenty-First Century, 45 Am. U. L. Rxv. 239, 303 (1995). Categorical
judgments by the state are less problematic because the public can control the content of those
judgments in a way dial. is not possible when representatives of the state make individualized
judgments.
130 Controversy over Kevorkian's 35th case of assisted suicide demonstrates that the public
will react unfavorably if it appears that the deceased individual did not have a morally justified
desire for death. In this case, there are allegations that the woman chose suicide because of a
treatable depression and abuse by her spouse. See Clash in Detroit Over How Ill a Kevorkian Client
Really Was, N.Y. TIMF.S, Aug. 20, 1996, at A13.
131 See Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide
—Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 735, 744-53 (1995) (discussing why it is likely that right to assisted suicide would be
extended to include patients who are not terminally ill but suffering greatly and to include right
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commit suicide with assistance. For society, a good proxy exists when
the law would generally distinguish between morally acceptable and
morally unacceptable decisions by patients to end their lives.'" In
particular, we would again have a good proxy from society's perspective
if the law generally would permit people to die when they are seriously,
incurably and irreversibly ill but generally would not permit people to die
when they are in good health or could be restored to good health.'"
Accordingly, if we still find that there are a substantial number of
persons who should be allowed to die but are not allowed to do so,
and there is a way to allow them to die without opening the door to
other persons who should not be allowed to die, then the law will
undergo further expansion. Conversely, if we find that permitting
assisted suicide for terminally ill persons results in a large number of
unjustified suicides, then the law will undergo contraction and restore
the distinction between treatment withdrawal and suicide assistance.
Is it likely that we will see further expansion of the right to die? I
will now consider the two most obvious areas for expansion.
A. Permitting Euthanasia for Terminally Ill Persons
If a terminally ill person enjoys a constitutional right to assisted
suicide, must we then permit euthanasia for terminally ill persons?'"
to euthanasia); Scofield, supra note 23, at 483-84 (arguing that right to assisted suicide would
not be limited to terminally ill patients).
I" See supra text accompanying notes 94-115.
I" I emphasize that the proxies generally work. An unqualified right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment means that otherwise healthy persons are permitted to refuse blood transfusions
necessary to prevent death or serious disability. One reason why society may be willing to accept
these apparent deviations from its sense of morality is that the cases generally involve a refusal
of treatment based on religious reasons and therefore implicate First Amendment concerns. See,
e.g., Stamford Hosp. v, Vega, 674 A.2d 821, 824-25 (Cann. 1996) (involving refusal of blood
transfusion by Jehovah's Witness who had lost good deal of blood after delivering child vaginally);
Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 78-79 (N.Y. 1990) (involving refusal of blood transfusion by
36-year-old Jehovah's Witness who was in good health except for loss of blood following cesarean
section). In addition, while appellate courts typically recognize the right to refuse the transfusion,
they often do so only after the person has received the transfusion because of an order by a lower
court. See, e.g., Vega, 674 A.2d at 826; In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 821 (Fla. 1993); Fosmire,
551 N.E.2d at 79. The Dubreuil case is particularly striking because the Florida Supreme Court
had previously held that a young woman could refuse blood transfusions even though she had
minor children. Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989). The only apparent
difference between the Dubreuil and Wons cases was that Ms. Dubreuil was estranged from her
husband while Ms. Wons was apparently living amicably with her husband. See Dubreuil, 629 So.
2d at 826. On the other hand, the Florida Supreme Court stated in Wons that "these cases demand
individual attention. No blanket rule is feasible which could sufficiently cover all occasions in
which this situation will arise." Watts, 541 So. 2d at 98.
194 By euthanasia, I primarily refer to situations in which a physician or other person seeks
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There may be terminally ill persons who are incapable of carrying out
a life-ending act by themselves but who have exactly the same reasons
for choosing death as other persons who can take a lethal dose of a
drug. If the mechanism of ending life is not morally significant, but
the justifications for ending life are morally determinative, then should
there not also be a right to euthanasia?' 35
However, the issue is not whether euthanasia can be distinguished
from assisted suicide in principle. Rather, the issue is whether permit-
ting euthanasia for the terminally ill is necessary to ensure a right to
die for persons who are morally justified in their desire to end their
life. It is unlikely that it would be necessary. Permitting euthanasia
would be needed only if there are a sizeable number of terminally ill
persons who are neither dependent on life-sustaining treatment nor
able to self-administer a lethal dose of a drug. However, it is difficult
to imagine that there are many persons who meet these conditions.
Terminally ill persons who are too incapacitated to take a lethal dose
of a drug are probably dependent on a life-sustaining treatment.
Indeed, the results of the referenda on assisted suicide in Califor-
nia and Washington also suggest that the public does not see euthana-
sia as necessary to ensure that patients can end their lives when they
are morally justified in doing so. Both referenda would have legalized
euthanasia as well as assisted suicide for terminally ill persons, 1" and
both referenda were defeated by 54-46% margins.'"
B. Permitting Assisted Suicide for Persons Who Are Not Terminally Ill
As many proponents of assisted suicide observe, patients often
experience great suffering before they become terminally ill; indeed,
several of Dr. Kevorkian's patients were not terminally ill when they
committed suicide with his assistance.'" If the right-to-die reflects the
individual's right to be free of inhumane suffering, then it is hard to
distinguish in principle between persons who are terminally ill and
those who are not.'"
to end the life of a patient by injecting the patient with a lethal dose of a drug. Euthanasia can
also occur through other means, including suffocation or gunshot.
199 See Miller et al., supra note 16, at 120 (proposing that physicians be allowed, under very
limited circumstances, both to assist suicides and to perform euthanasia).
196 See George j. Annas, Death by Prescription: The Oregon Initiative, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1240, 1240 (1994).
197 See Dolbee, supra note 5; Gross, supra note 4.
199 See, e.g., TIMOTHY E. QUILL, DEATH AND DIGNITY: MAKING CHOICES AND TAKING CHARGE
162 (1993); Sedler, supra note 15, at 795.
199 See Quill et al., supra note 116, at 1381.
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While these points are well taken, the issue again is whether there
is some categorical approach to permitting assisted suicide for persons
who are not terminally ill without going too far. It would not work to
permit assisted suicide for anyone who is experiencing "severe, unre-
lenting suffering"'" because there is no objective way to measure suf-
fering. All suicidal persons undoubtedly feel that they are experiencing
severe and unrelenting suffering. If severe suffering were the criterion,
then we would need physicians or someone else to make the kind of
individualized judgments that we are trying to avoid."'
The right to assisted suicide could be extended beyond terminal
illness categorically by permitting it for persons with certain severe
illnesses. For example, persons with AIDS might be permitted to end
their lives by assisted suicide. Similarly, persons diagnosed with amyot-
rophic lateral sclerosis might also be given a right to assisted suicide.'"
Whether this type of extension would occur is difficult to predict.
First, it is not clear that extending the right to assisted suicide to
patients who are not terminally ill would be necessary to ensure that
individuals with a morally justified desire to die have the option to end
their lives. Persons with AIDS or other serious diseases would enjoy a
right to assisted suicide once they became terminally ill. Moreover, a
person with AIDS or another disease might develop a life-threatening
but treatable bacterial infection before becoming terminally ill. If death
were desired, the individual could refuse treatment for the infection.
Second, it is not clear that extending the right to assisted suicide
would limit assisted suicide largely to patients who have a morally
justified desire to end their lives. As AIDS is becoming more treatable,
for example, many persons in the early stages of AIDS may not be
condemned to a life of great suffering. Requiring that the AIDS be
terminal is a way to distinguish among persons with AIDS in terms of
whether their desire for death is likely to be morally justified. The
question, then, is whether there is some earlier, reasonably objective
stage of AIDS or other diseases that is highly predictive of great suffer-
ing without hope for recovery. If there is, then it is possible that the
' 41) Id.
141 See supra text accompanying notes 105-15.
142 Amyou-oph c lateral sclerosis (ALS), or Lou Geh rig's disease, is a fatal degenerative disease
of the nervous system that affects the nerves controlling voluntary muscle movement. The disease,
whose cause is unknown, gradually leaves people unable to move their muscles. Ultimately, this
means not only that they cannot move their arms or legs but also that they cannot swallow, speak
intelligibly or breathe. Death usually occurs within a few years from inadequate lung function
combined with a lung infection. See Robert B. Layzer, Degenerative Diseases of the Nervous System,
in CECIL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 2050, 2053-54 (l. Claude Bennett & Fred Plum eds., 20th
ed. 1996).
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right to assisted suicide might be extended to include persons at that
earlier stage of AIDS or other diseases.
CONCLUSION
The recognition of a right to assisted suicide by Oregon and the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits is
likely to be followed by other courts and states because their new proxy
for morally justified deaths reflects a widely shared sentiment. Public
opinion polls have consistently demonstrated majority support for as-
sisted suicide for terminally ill patients." 3
 Physician opinion polls dem-
onstrate the same majority support. 144
 Moreover, when assisted suicide
referenda are rejected, as in California and Washington, the vote has
apparently reflected concern with the adequacy of safeguards and the
scope of the referenda rather than opposition to assisted suicide for
terminally ill patients per se.'4
 This is not to say that public opinion
provides moral justification for physician assisted suicide. Again, my
argument is descriptive, not normative. As the existence of capital
punishment in this country suggests, laws are driven as much by public
sentiment as by moral argument.
Because of the widely shared social sentiment in favor of some role
for physician assisted suicide, the United States Supreme Court's up-
coming decision on the existence of a constitutional right to assisted
suicide will only determine how soon a legal right to assisted suicide is
established. Even if the court finds no constitutional right, laws per-
mitting assisted suicide in limited circumstances will likely be adopted
widely because such laws will once again bring society's laws more
closely in line with society's moral values.
145 See Radish, supra note 57, at 860; Quill et al., supra note 116, at 1381.
144Jerald G. Bachman et al., Attitudes of Michigan Physicians and the Public Toward Legalizing
Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia, 334 New ENG. J. MED. 303, 303 (1996);
Jonathan S. Cohen et al., Attitudes Toward Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia Among Physicians in
Washington Stale, 331 NEw ENG, J. Men. 89, 89 (1994); Melinda A. Lee et al., Legalizing Assisted
Suicide—Views of Physicians in Oregon, 334 New ENG. J. Men. 310, 310 (1996).
14' See Rob Carson, Washington's I-119, 22(2) HASTINGS CENTER Rep. 7, 9 (1992); 1)olbee,
supra note 5. The California and Washington measures both would have permitted euillanasia
as well as assisted suicide. See supra text accompanying notes 135-36; see also Annas, supra note
108, at 1240.
